“Kyrgyz” Project Remains Task Priority in Moscow

Caspian Weekly  - With highly possible chances of renewed political instability in Kyrgyz Republic, Central Asian nation of Kyrgyzstan seems yet not through over April 2010 coup d'etat followed by months of violent turbulence in the country. Massive tragedy with Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks in the South has left extremely deep scars on the nation as country is still struggling to overcome the aftermath of the deadly ethnic conflict in June 2010. The result of political change in Bishkek did however produce more evidence of Russia's aggressive meddling in Kyrgyz political process as it has not been seen in the course of the last two decades throughout the region. On the flip side not every scholar shares such notion entirely although the Kremlin's actions draw certain pattern of interference in Kyrgyzstan. What we see in Bishkek is a quite sophisticated strategy managed by Russian officials that required broad use of Russia's intelligence services and economic pressure along with brilliantly orchestrated media coverage of Russia's state controlled TV channels against Bakiyev regime. Between ups and downs, Russian media continues to be a dominated “soft power” branch of Moscow's foreign policy in CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) republics.(1)
The question arises on complexity of interconnection between Moscow and Bishkek in the backdrop of the recent development in the country. Skepticism of some western analysts on the Kremlin's role in April upheaval barely reflects the picture on the ground while Moscow's close ties with Kyrgyz political establishment explains high efficiency of Russia's projects in the country. In February 2011, Moscow's newspaper Rosbalt broke the story of the scandalous resignation of FSB (Russian Intelligence Service) deputy chief, General Ushakov who was in charge of the “Kyrgyz” project in Central Asia.(2)

According to Rosbalt, deputy chief Ushakov was a citizen of Soviet Kyrgyz Republic back in the day working as KGB operative from 1975 up to 1994 when he was granted Russian citizenship. The same year in 1994, the ex-citizen of Kyrgyzstan moved to Russia's remote region where Ushakov continued his job as FSB appointee. In team with the head of the foreign intelligence analysis department (DOI section), General Komogorov who is one of the leading figures of the 'Kyrgyz” project (3), Ushakov had exclusive access to GKNB (Soviet analog of KGB) of Kyrgyzstan. Newspaper claims FSB deputy chief Ushakov has made considerable progress in nominating and installing figures of Kyrgyz background loyal to Moscow within GKNB hallways thus having authority over high ranking positions in the security apparatus of Kyrgyz Republic. Such trend was confirmed by appearance of GKNB official Marat Imankulov on the horizon who reportedly has ties with FSB General. (4) Russia's news sources highlighted the episode where Ushakov's nominee Imankulov landed the job of Secretary of State Security Board of Kyrgyz Republic after April coup in Bishkek last year.

Moscow ambitions in “Kyrgyz” project popped up with another experiment of similar scale but on the higher level of command chain inside the Kremlin. President Medvedev had initiated high level talks with President Otunbayeva in the spring of 2010 focused on the objectives of the Kremlin representative Rushailo (ex-Minister of Internal Affairs of Russia) who was dispatched to Kyrgyzstan immediately after Otunbayeva's approval. (5) The sources in the Government of Kyrgyz Republic say Rushailo has no skills as international consultant neither as diplomat given his background. Hollow from Bishkek also noted Rushailo's communicating approach with Kyrgyz authorities describing it as too direct and requiring unconditional implementation of requests from Moscow.

Russia's intelligence services were part of the all out exchanges between President Medvedev and Kyrgyz public officials in the summer of 2010 when Russian President has made harsh statement with regards to political situation in South Kyrgyzstan announcing possible “Afghanisation” of the country due to erupted violence in the cities of Osh and Jalalabad. (6) The Interim Government senior official Tekebayev shot back at Medvedev portraying Kremlin's security agencies in negative tone and claiming Moscow has been mislead by Russian intelligence on the real conditions in the republic. According to Tekebayev, Russia's GRU (Military Intelligence) and FSB deliberately confuse President Medvedev. One might argue if that is the case? Analysis of open source data from Russia suggests quite the opposite. Reportedly, GRU has been one of the primary sources of intelligence for Medvedev on volatile situation in Kyrgyzstan. (7) Nezavisimaya Gazeta newspaper source in GRU headquarters in Moscow confirmed reports of well organized groups of professional mercenaries and western NGOs working in conflict zone although it did not clarify the origins of foreigners as well as any relevance of NGOs to ethnic strife.

Meanwhile, a saboteur of Russian descent was caught by volunteers in the troubled areas of South Kyrgyzstan who has been distributing firearms in the affected by violence neighborhoods, according to graphic video footage posted on the internet.(8) In the video, interrogated and physically injured person who claimed to be a charter airline pilot from Moscow and a citizen of Russia was questioned by group of Kyrgyz men concerning the purposes of his routes through ethnic Uzbek blocks. A valid stance of recording has been confirmed by Bishkek based rights activist, Umetaliyeva in interview with MK-Asia correspondent. (9) Umetaliyeva's account of events takes description even further indicating GKNB's link to mysterious activities of foreigners during June 2010. Rights activist recounts a few cases of foreign nationals caught red-handed and recorded on cell phone devices by Kyrgyz captors. Arrested captives were picked up by GKNB field operatives, according to Umetaliyeva but later the same volunteers who helped to detain saboteurs became targets of Kyrgyzstan's security services. The Government of Kyrgyzstan has not commented on Umetaliyeva's allegations ever since.

Bakyt Beshimov, ex-leader of Socialist Democratic political faction in the Parliament of Kyrgyz Republic, currently residing in the US, claims there is a distinct connection between Kyrgyz Governments backtrack on detained foreign mercenaries and sudden appearance of Russian investigation team helping GKNB of Kyrgyzstan under auspices of CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organisation) to carry out task of "identifying groups and individuals involved in the instigation of riots in Kyrgyzstan, in cooperation with intelligence agencies of military organization. CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha was in charge of the mission.” (10) Neither GKNB or CSTO presented any results of work up to this date.

According to information posted on Beshimov's online page (11), during and the aftermath of conflict in Osh, reports of cheap AK-47 analogs, made in Chech Republic ($ 50-100), appearance on the black market in South Kyrgyzstan were coming out of violence torn areas in the summer of 2010. Dr. John Heathershaw from the University of Exeter (UK) stated that Russia is the only foreign entity, with the best contacts in central Asia, capable of having intelligence on sources of illegal arms trafficking in Kyrgyz Republic. (12)

The subject of illegal arms trafficking in conflict zone was reported by Azimjan Askarov, a prominent human rights activist of Uzbek ethnicity from Jalalabad province of Kyrgyzstan. Askarov while being imprisoned on politically motivated rationale and charged with murder of Kyrgyz police officer, in short interview with RFERL (Radio Liberty) says ethnic clashes have been planned in advance the proof of which Askarov and his colleagues have been collecting in May-June of last year. Jailed activist told journalist that in May 2010, “Kylym Shamy” NGO chief-activist, Abdurasulova and Askarov himself alerted local law enforcement authorities on arrival and spread of illegal firearms shipments in Osh and Jalalabad. (13) His documents and video files were confiscated by the Government of Kyrgyz Republic that has not commented on whereabouts of collected evidence nor produced any explanations ever since regarding Askarov's version which if found could dramatically shed light on critical occasions that took place weeks before the violence.

Prior record of Russia's military and security services role in armed conflicts in the CIS states reflects the shadow of the Kremlin back in the 90s when frozen ethnic conflicts and civil wars resurfaced on the map of the ex-Soviet regions. Recent investigative report by Asia-Plus online newspaper out of Tajik capital Dushanbe, provided some inside details of escalated civil war in Tajikistan.(14)

The report's subject was focused on the flow of weapons and the sources of firearms in the lead up to full blown conflict in 1992. According to Asia-Plus reporter Mirzobekova, Russia's 201- Motorized Rifle Division stationed in Tajikistan, has become one of the direct sources of arms for Tajik opposition members (Shahidontsi) in the spring of 1992. Asia-Plus investigation also revealed facts of flourishing trade of weapons initiated by Russian military garrison personnel to both sides of the conflict near the town of Lomonosov. On separate occasions Mirzobekova highlighted Uzbekistan Government's meddling in Tajik civil war as well.
Independent research project SAS (The Small Arms Survey), outlined by the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva (Switzerland) in 2004, approached the issue of arms trafficking on the regional scale. (15) SAS leading group under Neil MacFarlane and Stina Torjesen have published project results highlighting the established routes of firearms distribution system in Central Asia via Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

The Survey indicates three stages of arms trafficking through Ferghana Valley. First stage links the retreat of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989 with Russia's military assistance to friendly regime in Kabul. The second confirms supply of guns to different political factions from 1992 to 1997 during a civil war in Tajikistan. SAS evaluation of events in Tajikistan points out that significant amounts of firearms came from Russia, Uzbekistan, Iran and Afghanistan. The research project also says that distribution from Russian stockpiles during the armed conflict between Tajik opposition and pro-Government forces was endemic. On particular note, SAS brings up Russia's use of entranched Soviet military infrastructure via airports and land delivery chains from Osh (Kyrgyzstan) via Pamir mountains to Murgab (Tajikistan). The third stage of arms flow in Central Asia associated with large scale military operation in Afghanistan following September 11, 2001. According to research, US, NATO and Russia have been closely involved in re-arming the Northern Alliance and Afghan National Army.

SAS specifically states that Russia's arms supplies to the Northern Alliance in 1996 and after 2001 were transported via airports in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (Osh-Murgab route). Report also says that the Government of Uzbekistan refused to cooperate with the Kremlin on allowing Russia to use Uzbek territory as a transit point for weapons shipments due to President Karimov's decision to seal Uzbek-Afghan border and strained relations between Tashkent and Moscow. Bright example of Kyrgyzstan's status as international arms trafficking hub was demonstrated in October 1998 when three trains loaded with 700 tonnes of weapons and ammunition were intercepted and impounded at the rail terminus in the city of Osh. (16)

Rights watchdog HRW (Human Rights Watch) had conducted research on military assistance to the Taliban and the United Front of Afghanistan, the outcome of which was reflected in the report (“Afghanistan-Crisis of Impunity. The role of Pakistan, Russia and Iran in fueling the Civil War” July 2001). HRW concluded that “Russia has played leading role in securing cooperation amongst Central Asian republics in facilitating supplies of weapons and ammunition to Ahmad Shah Massoud's forces”. Report confirms Moscow's position in the region as a major arms supplier and logistics operator with well proven multiple cross-border inland and air delivery routes. According to report, Russian military forces based in Tajikistan have tightly controlled main border crossing points with Afghanistan although over the period of the decade Tajik Government took over the responsibility of guarding it's own borders. Former Anti-Drug Administration official of Tajikistan and military expert, Uyldashev claims Tajik Border Service has been a reliable force long after Russians transferred border control duties to country's military. (17)

Shipping large quantities of firearms from Afghanistan into ex-Soviet republics of Central Asia remains to be a difficult task requiring enormous involvement of flexible types of transportation in extensive numbers through extremely difficult terrains of Pamir and Tien Shen mountains. Commercially, such venture is unattractive given risks of being intercepted by military services of multiple states.

Neil MacFarlane and Stina Torjesen indicated that there is no credible evidence of trans-border arms shipments from Afghanistan to the North via Central Asia which was confirmed by local experts and Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies in 2004. Moreover, drug cartels tend to avoid large quantities of weapons accompanying heroin or opium loads due to projected unsustainability of such enterprises. SAS states that drug traffickers use guns for protection. It should be noted that intelligence services of Uzbekistan proved to be the most informed regional institution in Central Asia. The Foreign Ministry of Uzbekistan has made a statement on traces of large-scale arms shipments in southern Kyrgyzstan, weeks before the conflict in June 2010. (18)

In its own turn blamed for ethnic violence in South Kyrgyzstan, terrorist establishment IMU (the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) published concrete denial of any links with ethnic clashes in Osh and Jalalabad, on radical organization's propaganda website. (19) The Small Arms Survey suggests that IMU while being capable of moving around a small groups of unarmed fighters in the Ferghana Valley is not considered as major arms trafficker despite the fact of being detected in creating modest size caches of firearms and ammo in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Presumably, the Kremlin's ability to control sizable shipments of weapons and ammunition in Central Asia is out of question due to impressive record of moving large quantities of arms through the area. Having said that it is more than unlikely that Russian intelligence, deeply involved in the “Kyrgyz” project, would not be able to identify significant delivery of firearms in rocked by instability Kyrgyzstan. Government sources in Kyrgyz Republic say GKNB official Imankulov was handling the cases of missing foreign mercenaries from the time of their capture in June 2010. Since then, Imankulov has not mentioned the topic related to arrests of hired guns and their whereabouts. President Otunbayeva, Kyrgyz Parliament and the Government of Kyrgyzstan were successful in avoiding the controversial theme of “foreigners” for quite some time as well.

The International Commission on ethnic conflict in South Kyrgyzstan headed by Kimmo Kiljunen was also unable to clarify the issue of “third force” traced by SNB of Uzbekistan ( Uzbek intelligence). Vladimir Norov, head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan criticized Kiljunen's Commission status during OSCE summit in Astana (Kazakhstan) in December 2010. (20) Sources among Uzbek experts close to the Government circles in Tashkent concluded that Uzbekistan accurately shared some intelligence data on South Kyrgyzstan with the International Commission. Nevertheless, Kiljunen did not follow the lead shown by President Karimov. The cause of the International Commission's retreat from investigation of “third force” involvement remains to be a cliffhanger.

Meanwhile, reports from the ground in Osh and Jalalabad suggest that observed by rights activists covert movements of arms shipments, well before the escalation of violence in June 2010, did not cross the borders of neighboring states via inland logistics infrastructure. Analysis of the situation in Central Asia after April coup in Bishkek intends to characterize critical border crossing restrictions in the Ferghana Valley with extreme lock down on Uzbek-Kyrgyz perimeter. Kazakhstan went even further with total blockade of trans-border movements for months in the spring of 2010, thus shutting down lifeline of the Kyrgyz Republic's weak economy. Tajikistan took necessary adjustments on its own territory also. Kyrgyzstan section of the border has been a priority for China because of the grave concerns over Xinjang region's location that was a headline in the summer of 2009 when ethnic riots broke out between Uighur minority and Han migrants. In such circumstances, large-scale inland delivery of Chech made AK-47 analogs via Central Asian states to Kyrgyzstan is a serious challenge with chances of being compromised on every level of contact. Sources in Bishkek point out that local airports in Osh and Jalalabad were a scene of busy landings and takeoffs in May 2010. Most of the arrivals have been done by heavy transport aircraft during the nights. The identity of aircraft and the nature of landed commodities are yet unknown. Notably, the Government of Kyrgyzstan continues to stick up for original statement on instigators of ethnic strife in South Kyrgyzstan. According to GKNB, Bakiyev family members and extremists from IMU (with Taleban and Islamic Jihad Union) have orchestrated violent clashes. (21)


By Ryskeldi Satke

http://en.caspianweekly.org/main-subjects/caucasus/3952-kyrgyz-project-remains-task-priority-in-moscow.html

About author: Ryskeldi Satke is Kyrgyz freelance journalist and contributing writer for news institutions/research organizations in Turkey, Central Asia and Caucasus. He can be contacted via infojetweekly@aol.com

Notes:

1. Russian media offensive : Pre & Post-Crisis Kyrgyzstan. Caspian Weekly http://en.caspianweekly.org/main-subjects/others/turkish-world/3366-theme-russian-media-offensive-pre-a-post-crisis-kyrgyzstan.html
2. «Недостатки в работе» генерала Ушакова http://www.rosbalt.ru/main/2011/02/22/822168.html
3. Российские спецслужбы готовы к борьбе с киргизской оппозицией Axis, Global Challenges Research http://axisglobe-ru.com/safety/83
4. Протеже Москвы набирает обороты в Кыргызстане Caspian Weekly http://en.caspianweekly.org/main-subjects/others/turkish-world/3774-2011-03-14-12-39-12.html
5. Рушайло отправили в Киргизию в порядке эксперимента Gazeta.ru http://www.gzt.ru/topnews/politics/-rushailo-otpravili-v-kirgiziyu-v-poryadke-/305773.html?from=linksfromsingle
6. Kyrgyzstan slams Russia over ‘Afghanisation’ fears http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010/06/28/story_28-6-2010_pg20_5
7. Киргизское эхо российских маневров http://www.ng.ru/nvo/2010-06-24/1_kirgiz_echo.html
8. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0hcRFVICKaE
9. «МК-Азия»: Теракты в Кыргызстане спланировало правительство?http://www.fergananews.com/article.php?id=6889
10. Bakyt Beshimov: “Kyrgyzstan-How Political Success Justified Violence and Who Incited the Kyrgyz-Uzbek Conflict? http://beshimovbakyt.blogspot.com/2011/01/jtw-interview-bakyt-beshimov-kyrgyzstan.html
11. Оружие. Винтовка Ли - Энфильд и АК -47 http://beshimovbakyt.blogspot.com/2011/03/47.html
12. Beware of Meddling in Kyrgyzstan http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/john-heathershaw/beware-of-meddling-in-kyrgyzstan
13. Kyrgyz Activist: 'I Was Jailed For Telling The Truth' http://www.rferl.org/content/kyrgyz_protesters_rights_activist/2338715.html
14.  Таджикистан вооружается http://news.tj/ru/newspaper/article/tadzhikistan-vooruzhaetsya
15. Small Arms in Kyrgyzstan: A Small Arms Anomaly in Central Asia? by S. Neil MacFarlane and Stina Torjesen, February 2004. Occasional Paper No. 12
    http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/by-region/europe-and-central-asia.html#c1992
16. AFGHANISTAN CRISIS OF IMPUNITY The Role of Pakistan, Russia, and Iran in Fueling the Civil War http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2001/afghan2/
17. А.Юлдашев: Зачем Таджикистану нужны российские пограничники? http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1292835000
18. An Interview with Bakyt Beshimov on Political Situation in Central Asia http://engarticles.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=311881
19. Кыргызтандагы акыркы окуяларга карата кайрылуу http://furqon.com/Maqolalar/abbas-mansur-kg.html
20. Киммо Килюнен: Комиссия собрала объемный материал http://rus.azattyk.org/content/Kyrgyzstan_kilunen_osh_events/3437284.html
21. Elusive Search for Kyrgyz Unrest Culprits http://iwpr.net/report-news/elusive-search-kyrgyz-unrest-culprits